University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 40
Number 1 Fall 2009

Article 16

2009

Recent Developments: University System of
Maryland v. Mooney: Third Party Assignees to a
Contract with the State of Maryland or Its Units,
When Seeking to Recover Funds Due under the
Contract, Must Exhaust Administrative Remedies
Prior to Seeking Judicial Relief
Kristin Drake

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Drake, Kristin (2009) "Recent Developments: University System of Maryland v. Mooney: Third Party Assignees to a Contract with
the State of Maryland or Its Units, When Seeking to Recover Funds Due under the Contract, Must Exhaust Administrative Remedies
Prior to Seeking Judicial Relief," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 40 : No. 1 , Article 16.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol40/iss1/16

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

RECENT DEVELOPMENT

UNIVERSITY SYSTEM OF MARYLAND v. MOONEY: THIRDPARTY ASSIGNEES TO A CONTRACT WITH THE STATE
OF MARYLAND OR ITS UNITS, WHEN SEEKING TO
RECOVER FUNDS DUE UNDER THE CONTRACT, MUST
EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES PRIOR TO
SEEKING JUDICIAL RELIEF.
By: Kristin Drake

T

he Court of Appeals of Maryland held that third-party assignees to
a contract with the state or any of its units, who are looking to
recover funds due to them under the contract, are required to exhaust
all available administrative remedies prior to seeking relief in the
courts. Univ. Sys. of Md. v. Mooney, 407 Md. 390, 966 A.2d 418
(2009). Specifically, the court held that assignees of a contract
governed by the State Finance and Procurement Article were persons
within the meaning of the Article and thus required to follow the same
administrative procedures as original contracting parties. Id. at 412,
966 A.2d at 430-31.
In October 2002, Kevin and Teresa Mooney ("Mooneys") lent
Chesapeake Cable, LLC ("Chesapeake") $250,000 in exchange for
two promissory notes and a security agreement. In April 2003, after
Chesapeake defaulted on the loan, the Mooneys perfected their
security interest and became the assignee of Chesapeake's accounts
receivable. Shortly thereafter, the University System of Maryland
("University") issued a check to Chesapeake for services previously
rendered.
On June 4, 2004, the Mooneys filed suit against the University in
the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. The suit alleged that
the University violated section 9-406(a) of the Commercial Law
Article of the Maryland Code, which requires an account debtor to
discharge his or her obligation by paying the assignee directly after
receiving notification that an amount due has been assigned. The
circuit court held that, because there was no written contract between
the Mooneys and the University, the Mooneys' claim was a tort action.
The Mooneys appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland,
which held that the circuit court erred and remanded the case.
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On remand, the circuit court held that the Mooneys could not sue
the University because of the principle of sovereign immunity. The
Mooneys again appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland,
which held that the Mooneys could enforce Chesapeake's contractual
rights. The judgment of the circuit court was vacated and the case was
remanded. The University then petitioned the Court of Appeals of
Maryland for a writ of certiorari, which the court granted.
Before the Court of Appeals of Maryland, the University argued
that, before the Mooneys could bring their contract action to court,
they were required to seek administrative relief by filing an appeal
with the Maryland State Board of Contract Appeals ("Appeals
Board"). Mooney, 407 Md. at 400, 966 A.2d at 424. The court
determined that, despite the University raising it for the first time in its
petition for certiorari, the issue of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is treated like a jurisdictional question, and thus may be
raised by the court sua sponte. !d. at 401-02, 966 A.2d at 425 (citing
Sec y, Dep 't of Human Res. v. Wilson, 286 Md. 639, 645, 409 A.2d
713, 717 (1979)).
The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis by discussing
Zappone v. Liberty Life Insurance Co., which provided the factors for
determining whether the administrative remedies under a statute are
exclusive, primary, or concurrent. !d. at 403, 966 A.2d at 426 (citing
Zappone v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 349 Md. 45, 60-61, 706 A.2d 1060,
1067-68 (1998)). Zappone held that, in the absence of statutory
language to the contrary, there exists a rebuttable presumption that
administrative remedies are intended to be primary. !d. at 404, 966
A.2d at 426 (citing Zappone, 349 Md. at 63, 706 A.2d at 1069). The
court relied on factors used in Zappone to evaluate when the
presumption is refuted. !d. (citing Zappone, 349 Md. at 64-65, 706
A.2d at 1070). These factors included the comprehensive nature of the
administrative remedy, the agency's view of the breadth of its
jurisdiction, and the nature of the separate judicial cause of action
sought by the plaintiff. !d.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland first looked at Title 15, Subtitle
2 of the State Finance and Procurement Article, which governs
contract disputes with the University. Mooney, 407 Md. at 406, 966
A.2d at 427. In particular, the court analyzed four sections: section
15-211, which grants the Appeals Board jurisdiction over all appeals;
section 15-217, which provides that a person awarded a procurement
contract may submit a claim to a procurement officer; section 15-220,
which states that a contractor may appeal a final action to the appeals
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board; and section 15-223, which allows for judicial review of final
decisions of the Appeals Board. ld. at 407, 966 A.2d at 428. (citing
MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §§ 15-211, 15-217, 15-220, 15223 (2006)).
In applying the Zappone factors to this statutory scheme, the court
noted that it had considered these four sections in an earlier decision,
wherein it deemed that the remedy was either exclusive or primary,
but not concurrent. ld. at 408, 966 A.2d at 429 (citing SEFAC Lift &
Equip. Corp. v. Mass Transit Admin., 367 Md. 374, 788 A.2d 192
(2002)). The court determined that, although the use of the words "all
appeals" in section 15-211 seemed to grant exclusive jurisdiction to
the appeals board, no such inference could be drawn from section 15217 or section 15-220. ld. at 407-08, 966 A.2d at 428. The court
found that the language in these sections did not explicitly require that
claimants exhaust administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial
relief, in part because the language is discretionary ("may appeal")
rather than mandatory ("shall appeal"). ld. The court determined that
the language used in these sections indicated that the remedy for
contract disputes was not intended to be exclusive. ld.
In finding that the remedy under the statute was not exclusive, the
court determined that the statutory language in question did not
support a rebuttal of the presumption that the remedies were primary.
Mooney, 407 Md. at 408, 966 A.2d at 428. The court reasoned that the
Appeals Board viewed its jurisdiction as primary because it was able
to decide all contractual disputes with any state agency. ld. (quoting
MD. CODE REGS. 21.02.02.02 (2009)). The language giving the
Appeals Board jurisdiction over all disputes, taken together with the
statutes considered by the court, led the court to conclude that the
administrative remedy for contract disputes with state agencies was
primary. Jd. at 409, 966 A.2d at 429.
Next, the court considered whether the Mooneys were "a person"
for the purpose of section 15-217. ld. at 410-12, 966 A.2d at 429-30
(citing MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 15-217). The court
noted that section 15-217 used the definition found in section 11-101,
which defined a "person" as "an individual, receiver, trustee, guardian,
personal representative, fiduciary, or representative .... " I d. at 411,
966 A.2d at 430 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 11101 (2006)). The court determined that this language indicated that
section 15-217 should be applied to third parties representing the
interests of original contracting parties. ld. The court reasoned that
the Mooneys were "a person" as defined by the statute because the

2009]

State Contract Assignees Must Exhaust Remedies

153

Mooneys were collecting funds that were originally due to another
party. Mooney, 407 Md. at 411,966 A.2d at 430.
The court then analyzed the Mooney's rights as assignees. !d. The
court relied on section 9-404(a) of the Commercial Law Article ofthe
Maryland Code, which states that assignees of a contract are subject to
the terms of the original agreement. !d. (citing MD. CODE ANN., COM.
LAw § 9-404(a) (2002)). Expanding on this concept, the court
determined that, because an assignee was subject to the same contract
terms as the original parties, the assignee was also subject to the same
procedural requirements. !d. at 412, 966 A.2d at 430-31. Therefore,
the court held that the Mooneys were required to follow the same
procedure that Chesapeake would have been required to follow, and
exhaust all administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial relief. Id
at 412, 966 A.2d at 431.
In holding that assignees are subject to the same procedural
requirements as original contracting parties in state contracts, the court
has clarified where assignees should seek relief. Under the State
Finance and Procurement Article, both original and third-parties must
first file their claim administratively before seeking a judicial remedy.
In cases where an attorney is uncertain as to whether a statute requires
an exhaustion of administrative remedies, the safest practice is to file
the claim both administratively and judicially. If necessary, the trial
court can stay the claim pending an administrative decision.

